Caesar Campbell v R

JurisdictionTurks and Caicos Islands
JudgeGround C.J.S.C.
Judgment Date16 February 2008
Docket Number[2000] TCA J. No.2; No. CR/APM 15/99
CourtSupreme Court (Turks and Caicos)
Date16 February 2008

Supreme Court

Ground C.J.

[2000] TCA J. No.2; No. CR/APM 15/99

Caesar Campbell
and
Regina
Appearances:

C. Griffiths for the appellant.

E. Welch for the respondent.

Cases:

Solon Georges v. The Queen Cr. App. No. 2 of 1993 (Turks & Caicos)

Acqui v. Pooran Mahraj [1983] 34 W.I.R. 282 (Trinidad)

Alexander v. William 340

Gonzalez v. The Queen [1964/85] C.I.L.R. 10

Helner v. The Queen [1984/85] C.I.L.R. 171 (Cayman Islands)

Legislation:

Section 52 of the Criminal Procedure Code of The Cayman Islands

Criminal Practice and Procedure - Functus officio — Appeal from Magistrates' — Whether the Chief Magistrate was functus officio where the Chief Magistrate had provided a memorandum of his reasons for his verdict after he had given an oral verdict months earlier — Whether the Chief Magistrate should have provided oral reasons for his verdict at the date of his verdict rather than giving reasons later than the delivery of the verdict — Finding that the reasons given by the Chief Magistrate should stand — Finding that the practice of oral reasons should be given at the time of the verdict — Granted the Appellant time to amend his notice of appeal

RULING
Ground C.J.S.C.
1

— I will rule briefly on this preliminary point. I will tape what I say, and then have it typed up. Then it can stand as a ruling on this point for the future.

2

The brief factual background relevant to Mr. Griffiths's point is that the appellant was convicted on the 3rd September last year. At the time of conviction the learned Chief Magistrate gave short oral reasons, which Mr. Griffiths, at least, noted. A Notice of Appeal was then filed on the 9th September, just in time.

3

Subsequent to that, on the 24th November 1999, in two completely unrelated cases (CR/AP 9 & 10/99) I gave a general ruling that the Chief Magistrate should, as a matter of course, provide reasons for his decisions, but this should be done in response to a Notice of Appeal, or at least when a Notice of Appeal was lodged.

4

Subsequent to that it appears that, in this case, the learned Chief Magistrate provided a “memorandum” of his reasons. Regrettably, but understandably given the timing of my ruling in the other matter, that memorandum was not made available to the parties to the appeal until shortly before this matter came on for hearing before me today. I have not got the exact date, but I accept what Mr. Griffiths says.

5

Mr. Griffiths's objection to this practice is that the magistrate, once he delivers his verdict, is functus officio and may not, therefore, return to or reopen the matter. He also says the practice itself is unfair because it enables the magistrate in his reasons to address the points taken in the Notice of Appeal.

6

In this particular case Mr. Griffiths also complains of the length of time between the verdict and the memorandum of reasons, and relies upon a particular factual circumstance. That is this — Mr. Griffiths submitted his notes of what the magistrate said at the time to the magistrate for his confirmation, as is the proper practice and as he should have done. The magistrate said that he was unable to confirm the note because he did not now remember what he had said. Based on that, Mr. Griffiths urged that if he could not remember what he said, how could he remember the thought processes that led him to his judgment?

7

In support of his position that the magistrate should have given reasons at the time, and that the subsequent reasons are unacceptable, Mr. Griffiths relies upon a judgment by a former Chief Justice of the Turks and Caicos Islands, Douglas, C.J., in the case of Solon Georges v. The Queen, Cr. App. No. 2 of 1993 (and that is at Tab 5 of Mr. Griffiths' bundle). In that case the learned Chief Justice ruled that the magistrate should give reasons, and that he should give them at the time of giving the judgment in Court and before the pronouncement of his sentence. He also held that thereafter the magistrate would become functus officio.

8

In support of that ruling the learned Chief Justice relied upon the Trinidadian case of Acqui v. Pooran Maharaj (1983) 34 W.I.R. 282. That case is authority for the proposition that, although there is no statutory provision expressly requiring a magistrate to state reasons for his decisions, the practice of doing so has grown up and been adhered to over the years, so that it will now properly be regarded...

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